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INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the problem of the dis-
posal of high-level nuclear waste, pro-
duced by Canadian nuclear reactors,
was receiving increasing attention
(Aikens et al. 1977). From the onset,
and to the present, the preferred solu-
tion was placing the spent fuel bundles
at a single (central) site somewhere in
the Canadian Shield, at a depth of sev-
eral hundred metres (Aiken et al. 1977;
Tammemagi et al. 1977; AECL 1994;
OHN 1994; NWMO 2005). Although
different types of rock were consid-
ered, including limestone and shale, a
large body of homogeneous granite
was almost invariably viewed as being
the most suitable as a repository. If
adopted, the central-site concept would
require major excavation of rock (site)
and the transport of about 3.6 million
spent fuel bundles from the reactors
located in Ontario, Quebec and New
Brunswick, to the central repository
(Table 1). In the “Adaptive Phased
Management” proposal of NWMO
(2005), the fuel bundles would initially
be placed at a depth of 50 m and later
moved to a depth of several hundred
metres, or returned to the surface for
reprocessing.
During the past three and a
half decades, several changes have
occurred in Canada and abroad that
call for a re-examination of the nuclear
waste problem and a critical evaluation
of the central-site concept. These
changes are as follows:
1) As a result of recent advances in
the design of rock drills, it is now
possible to drill vertical boreholes
six or more metres in diameter to
a depth of several hundred metres.
(Franklin and Dusseault 1989;
Tativa 2005), making it unneces-
sary to send workers underground.
Drilling is relatively easy in lime-
stone, the common rock type
beneath the generating stations in
southern Ontario, and the rate of
drilling is about three metres an
hour for large-diameter boreholes.
2) Public opposition to nuclear ener-
gy has increased as a consequence
of the Chernobyl incident in 1986;
this attitude was expressed repeat-
edly during the Seaborn hearings
(Seaborn 1998). Therefore, it
seems unlikely that people, who
live in the transport corridors,
leading from nuclear generating
stations to the central site, will
accept the movement of trucks or
trains laden with highly radioactive
waste through their communities.
With 192 fuel bundles in each
transport cask, three 18-wheel
tractor-trailer trucks would arrive
at the central site each day for 20
years. Or, if transport is by rail (10
freight cars each with three casks),
30 trains would arrive at the cen-
tral site each year for 20 years.
Caccia (2007) has emphasized that
major socio-political problems
must be expected, especially with-
in, and adjoining, the transport
corridors.
3) During the past 3 ½ decades,
focus on the environment has
increased enormously, culminating,
recently, in a concern over global
warming and the role of carbon
dioxide emissions from vehicles in
contributing to this warming. At a
time when hydrocarbon resources
should be conserved and CO2
emissions need to be reduced, the
central-site plan will require 18
million kilometres of truck travel,
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Table 1. Estimates of future accumulated number of spent nuclear fuel bundles
(thousands of bundles)
End of % End of End of
20041 20142 20242
Bruce-Douglas Point (ON) 819 43.9 1,191 1,565
Pickering (ON) 555 29.6 807 1,058
Darlington (ON) 281 15.0 409 536
Gentilly (QC) 102 5.4 148 193
Point Lepreau (NB) 112 6.0 163 214
Chaulk River (ON) 5 0.26 N N
Whiteshell (MB) 0.4 0.03 N N
Total 1874.4 100 2,718 3,566
Note: 1 from NWMO (2005). 2 Based on 85,000 fuel bundles/year (Dormuth
1997). N small number, no estimate attempted
assuming a central site in the vicin-
ity of Sudbury. A total of 6 mil-
lion litres of fuel would be con-
sumed (CT 2006). For rail or com-
bined truck rail transport, these
numbers are somewhat lower, but
if the central site is “remote”
(Aiken et al. 1977) or in
Saskatchewan (being considered by
NWMO 2005), the numbers will
be much larger. In addition, there
would be emissions of nitrogen
oxide and other pollutants from
the burned hydrocarbons.
4) Until recently, health effects of
low-level ionizing radiation (above
the background levels of 2-3
mSv/year) were largely unknown
and controversial (Chapman and
McCombie 2003). In 1992, a
detailed study of 95,247 British
workers in the nuclear industry
(Kendall et al. 1992) produced
“evidence for an association
between radiation exposure and
mortality from cancer, in particu-
lar, leukaemia (excluding chronic
lymphatic leukaemia) and multiple
myeloma”. Based on their results,
some environmentalists have
argued that the maximum allow-
able dose of 20 mSv/year, the
number adopted internationally
and by AECL (1994), should be
reduced to 10 mSv/year (Aldhous
1992). Although fuel bundles are
moved robotically and workers are
shielded, the number of times that
the fuel bundles are moved from
one place to another in the pres-
ence of workers should obviously
be minimized. In the no-retrieval
central-site concept envisaged by
NWMO (2005), each fuel bundle
would be moved at least eight
times. The crucial question here is,
which of two plans should be
adopted, one that will expose n
workers to x mSv/year of radia-
tion (central-site), or the other that
will call for less handling of the
waste and will expose fewer work-
ers to less radiation (multi-reposi-
tory).
5) Since the Oka confrontation in
1990 and the appearance of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples Report in 1996, the num-
ber of unresolved land claims in
Canada has increased from 400 to
800 and is expected to grow. One-
third of these are in Ontario, Que-
bec and Atlantic Canada (INAC
2007). Although members of
NWMO provide assurance that
these claims will be respected
when choosing a central repository
site (NWMO 2005), some resist-
ance from Native People, now and
sometime in the future, must be
expected with regard to the loca-
tion of a central site and the trans-
port corridors.
In addition, there is the trou-
bling question of how many human
injuries and deaths will occur during
the transport and mining operations
that form an integral part of the cen-
tral-site solution. With regard to trans-
port, deaths and injuries have
decreased on Canadian roads since
1986 (by a factor of 0.75), but the
numbers themselves remain high at
3,000 deaths and 211,000 injuries a
year (TC 2005, 2006). Although the 18
million kilometres of truck travel cal-
culated above are relatively small, acci-
dents involving the transport trucks
will certainly occur in the projected 20-
year period. Accidents involving trains
are not as common, but if rail trans-
port is used, some injuries must be
expected. With regard to rock excava-
tion at the central site, adverse health
effects (e.g. silicosis) and injuries or
fatalities (from rock bursts and other
accidents) are predictable. Members of
AECL (1994) have estimated a maxi-
mum of 2590 injuries and 12 deaths
during 64 years of construction, opera-
tion, and decommissioning. Thus some
consideration should be given to possi-
ble solutions to the waste problem that
require very little transport of the




In a multi-repository, near-reactor
model, large-diameter boreholes are
drilled from surface to a depth of 150
m, spent-fuel bundles are placed in
metal containers (canisters), and the
containers are lowered into the bore-
holes that are then capped and sealed.
Consider, for example, the
construction of a repository near the
Pickering generating station, 32 km
east of Toronto (Table 1). A drill hole
at the town of Pickering (OGS-83-3,
elevation 89.7m) encountered near-
horizontal beds of Ordovician lime-
stone and shale as follows (Johnson
1983):
0-25 m - unconsolidated sedi-
ment (overburden)
25-44 m - Blue Mountain For-
mation; shale
44-48 m - Lindsay Formation;
shale and calcareous
shale
48-81 m - Lindsay Formation;
limestone
81-148 m - Verulam Formation;
limestone, minor cal-
careous shale
148-198 m - Bobcaygeon Forma-
tion; limestone, minor
shale
198-227 m - Gull River Formation;
limestone
227-236 m - Shadow Lake Forma-
tion; impure lime-
stone, siltstone, sand-
stone. At     base,
quartz conglomerate
236-251 m - Precambrian rocks;
gneiss
Following the selection of a
suitable site, preferably less than 1 km
from the generating station, a borehole
1.5 m in diameter is drilled to a depth
of 150 m. Prior to drilling, groundwa-
ter is withdrawn to depress the water
table, if necessary. The borehole is
lined with metal tubing, and the space
between the lining and the wall is filled
with fine aggregate (sand) concrete,
which also acts as a grouting material.
Note that, unlike conventional shaft-
sinking procedures, the drilling opera-
tion produces few (unwanted) frac-
tures. The repository will extend from
50 to 150 m, and will occur within
limestone and minor shale (see above).
Different sizes of corrosion-
resistant metal containers can be
designed, but the one proposed here is
a hexagonal prism, 1.2 m in diameter
and 2.0 m high; this will take 360 fuel
bundles (each 10 cm in diameter and
0.5 m long) in a honey-comb configu-
ration. Fifty of these containers (a total
of 18,000 bundles) are lowered into
the borehole to form a cylindrical
repository. Spaces between fuel bun-
dles in the containers and between the
containers and the steel liner are filled
with finely ground cuttings (limestone
152
and shale fragments brought to the
surface during the drilling operation);
lime (CaO) could be added, which
reacts with water to form Ca(OH)2. In
2014, approximately 807,000 waste-fuel
bundles will have been produced at
Pickering (Table 1) and these will
require about 45 repositories, con-
structed sequentially in groups of 12.
The grid could be squared or hexago-
nal. The repositories, when separated
at 100 m intervals to facilitate heat loss,
will form an array beneath a surface
area of 0.40 km². Sensors placed
underground would monitor tempera-
ture, groundwater flow, and radioactivi-
ty. Retrieval of the waste containers, if
necessary, would be a relatively simple
matter. By increasing the diameter of
the boreholes, fewer would be needed;
indeed, many variations of the above
scenario are possible.
Most of the other nuclear
generating stations are underlain by
rocks similar to those beneath Picker-
ing. At the Darlington generating sta-
tion 30 km to the east, the same rock
formations are present and it may be
possible to form a single repository
array somewhere between the two sta-
tions. At the Bruce generating station
(on the shore of Lake Huron), the
underlying rock, consists of gently dip-
ping Upper Silurian and Lower Devon-
ian limestone (mainly dolomitic lime-
stone) and minor sandstone to a depth
of 300 m; Precambrian rocks lie at a
depth of nearly 1100 m (Johnson et al.
1992). The Gentilly generating station,
east of Trois-Rivières in Quebec, is sit-
uated on Upper Ordovician shale and
limestone (Dresser and Denis 1944).
However, the Point Lepreau
station, in New Brunswick, is situated
on Triassic sandstone and conglomer-
ate; limestone is rare within 30 km of
the generating station but several vari-
eties of granitic rock occur (McLeod et
al. 1994). At Chalk River and
Whiteshell, in Ontario and Manitoba
respectively, granitoid rocks are also
present (Douglas 1970) but the num-
bers of spent fuel bundles in tempo-
rary storage are low relative to the
other generating stations (Table 1).
Drilling large-diameter boreholes in
granitoid rocks is not as easy as it is in
limestone but it can be done.
The view that a nuclear waste
repository must necessarily lie at a
depth of several hundred metres,
rather than at 3000 m (the deepest
mines) or at 100 m (the present pro-
posal), is questionable. It is generally
agreed that storing the fuel bundles at
the Earth’s surface or in unconsolidat-
ed sediment is not acceptable. Howev-
er, it is not clear why a depth of some
800 m is required or why all of the
waste must be stored at a single site.
One argument for deep burial
is that after 100,000 years, the time
needed for radioactivity to decrease
from 1016 to 10 9 Bq/kg of uranium
(Wiles 2002), comparable to that of
uranium ore, erosion could expose the
fuel bundles. However, the rate of ero-
sion in regions of low to moderate ele-
vation and low relief (e.g. the Missis-
sippi basin) is only 1 m/100,000 years
(Holmes 1965) and the repositories
described here, extending from 50 to
150 m would certainly not be exposed
until much later.
Another consideration is that
fuel bundles will come in contact with
groundwater, which in rock moves
principally along fractures. Few studies
of fracture density as a function of
depth are available, but Stone et al.
(1989) have shown that in one 1,200 m
borehole in granite, the fracture density
remains nearly constant to 1,000 m,
and then increases. Although, in gener-
al, groundwater flux is expected to
decrease with depth (Cherry and Gale
1979), data from deep mines indicate
that much variation exists in the
amount of water that must be pumped
to the surface to keep the mines dry.
Moreover, in view of changes in cli-
mate, groundwater systems can be
expected to change with time, and a
repository site that is relatively dry and
favourable today, need not be so 1,000
years from now. In the repositories
that are proposed here, the uranium
oxide pellets are surrounded by seven
barriers, and it seems highly unlikely
that appreciable groundwater would
penetrate all of these barriers in
100,000 years. But in view of the very
small size of the water molecule, some
penetration by diffusion should be
entirely acceptable, regardless of burial
depth, in conformity with the laws of
thermodynamics.
There is also the question of
heat flow from spent fuel into the bar-
riers and into the wall rock. Franklin
and Dusseault (1991) have noted that
in a deep repository, fuel bundles, bar-
riers, and wall rock could be heated to
temperatures as high as 230° C. Given
that the rates of chemical transforma-
tions, including diffusion, increase rap-
idly with an increase in temperature,
considerable damage to the repository
systems can be expected. At a depth of
100 m, release of heat would occur
more readily, and could, to some
extent, be controlled and utilized.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the multi-repository
solution to the nuclear waste problem,
proposed here, offers many advantages
over the central-site solution that for
many years has been advocated by
members of AECL (1994) and recently
by members of NWMO (2005). These
advantages include the following:
- Fewer injuries to the public
resulting from traffic acci-
dents,
- Fewer adverse health effects
among workers resulting from
rock excavation,
- Fewer deaths and adverse
health effects among workers
exposed to radiation,
- Greater respect for native peo-
ples and their land-resource
claims,
- Greater respect for members
of the public who oppose the
transport of radioactive waste
through their communities
- Less addition of CO2 to the
atmosphere
- Less pollution to the atmos-
phere
- No transport casks needed
- Greater ease of heat escape
- Greater ease of retrieval of
fuel bundles
- Anticipated lower costs
In view of the magnitude of
the nuclear waste problem, i.e. to iso-
late certain toxic materials for 100,000
years, one must wonder why various
solutions to the problem, including the
one presented here, are not receiving
more attention.
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